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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

November 25 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 81-430 CSY

Cert to Ill S Ct (Ward for the
court; Moran [diss] with
Underwood)

Illinois

v.
Gates, et ux.
SUMMARY:

State/Criminal

Timely

The state contends that a letter from an

.-.

anonymous informer, together with corroborating circumstances,
was sufficient probable cause under Aguilar for issuance of a
-search warrant.
Police in Bloomingdale,
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW:

Illinois, received an anonymous letter regarding the resps.

It

-

2 -

listed their address and stated that they made their living
selling drugs.
operation.

Further, the letter described their method of

According to the letter, resp Sue would drive resps'

car to Florida where i t would be loaded with drugs.
would fly to Florida and drive the car back.
return by plane.

Resp Lance

Then Sue would

Moreover, the letter warned that Sue would

drive to Florida on May 3 as part of another drug transaction.

And, the letter told the police that resps had over $100,000 in
drugs in their basement.

With the help of a confidential informant who provided
police with access to financial records, the police confirmed

that the letter gave resps' correct address.

Police also

discovered that L. Gates had a reservation on a May 5 flight to

Florida.

A DEA agent followed Lance, who flew to Florida and

went to a motel room registered to Sue.

The agent saw Lance

leave with a woman (presumably Sue) in a car with Illinois tags.
The police found that the tags were registered in Lance's name,

but for a different car.
The police then obtained a search warrant from an Illinois
court to search resps' home and the car they were using in
Florida.

Resps arrived back at their home by car on May 7.

The

police were waiting, searched the trunk of resps' car, and found

350 lbs of marijuana.
-

drug paraphernalia

In the house were marijuana, weapons, and

In addition, resps were in

possession

of

cocaine.
Resps were indicted for drug offenses, and Lance was charged
with possession of an unlicensed firearm.

Pretrial, resps moved

-

3 -

to suppress the fruits of the search, contending that the letter
did not provide probable cause for the warrant.

They argued that

the anonymous letter did not set forth the underlying circumstances on which the informer based his report or
underlying circumstances which would indicate that the letter was

reliable, as required by Aguilar v. Texas, 378

u.s.

108 (1964).

They also contended that the police investigation did not
corroborate the accusation that the resps were involved in

criminal activity.

The trial court agreed with resps, and the

I l l Ct App affirmed.

The Ill S Ct also affirmed.

Aguilar has two prongs, a

"basis of knowledge'' prong and a veracity prong.

The letter

fails the first test, because it did not describe how the
informer knew that resps were involved in the drug trade.

The

informer's report may have been based on hearsay, not the

informer's personal observation.

The letter also fails the

veracity test, because the police had no idea who the informer
was.

They had no way of knowing whether the informer could be

trusted or not.
Harris, 403

u.s.

And, unlike the informer in United States v.
573 (1971), this informant made no statement

against penal interest.
--

Furthermore, the corroborating police investigation did not

cure these deficiencies.

See Spinelli v. United States, 393

u.s.

410 (1969).

The police determined that the informer gave resps'
-correct addres s and that resps' were driving back from Florida,
.-

but those details did not es tablish that the informer's letter
was based on personal knowledge rather than rumor.

Also, the

- 4 police investigation discovered no criminal activity before the
search.

Thus, the police had no reason to think that this

anonymous informer wrote from personal knowledge or that he was
reliable.

The investigation was not sufficient to satisfy

Aguilar.

The dissent thought that the corroborating investigation,
combined with the detail of the letter, satisfied Augilar.

The

corroborating information demonstrated that the informer had an
adequate basis for his knowledge.

This case is like Draper v.

United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), in which the police confirmed
the details of an informer's story to obtain probable cause.

The

corroborating information also showed that the informer was
probably telling the truth.

The police may have discovered only

innocent activity, but the informer's letter contained many

details which proved accurate, so that the innocent activity

became suspicious in light of the letter's accusations.
CONTENTIONS:

dissent.

The state elaborates on the arguments of the

When an informer's tip is sufficiently detailed, it

will confirm itself.
concurring).

See Spinelli, 393

u.s.

at 425 (White, J.,

This case is like Draper, in which the informer's

report was corroborated and the Court found probable cause.

It

is not like Spinelli, in which the Court found no probable cause

because the informer provided few details and the police
investigation supplied only limited corroboration.
Whitely v. Warden, 401

u.s.

-

See

-

also

560 (1971) (informant's tip can supply

probable cause together with information gathered by police).

In

-

5 -

addition, under Draper, innocent activity can help to provide
probable cause, if it corroborates an informant's story .
Resps observe that all three Illinois courts determined:

(1)

the anonymous letter did not describe the means by which the
informer obtained his information;

(2) the corroboration of

innocent detail was insufficient to cure the inadequate "basis of
knowledge" information in the letter;

(3) reliance on Draper is

misplaced, because that case involved a previously reliable

informer, one who supplied a greater degree of specificity of
detail.

Resps also insist that this is a fact-bound case applying
the established rules of Aguilar.

Furthermore, the case involves

an anonymous letter, a notoriously unreliable source of
information.

DISCUSSION:

This case boils down to a factual disputeover

whether it is more like Spinelli or Draper.

Three Illinois

courts decided that the corroboration in this case did not
demonstrate that a tip in an anonymous letter provided probable
cause.

Although the tip ultimately proved correct, there was no

reason to believe that the author of the letter would tell the
truth, and the police investigation revealed no criminal

activity.
cause,

letter.

The Illinois S Ct might have reasonably found probable

based on the corroboration of several details in the
But its decision is not clearly in error,

is fact-bound.
I

recommend denial.

....

and this
-

.

case

